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I. INTRODUCTION
Can we see how different the 5-4 majorities of the United States Supreme
Court are? What is the number of swing votes connecting them and their relative
importance?
In a previous article in this journal, we developed a method for displaying the
swing votes of a supreme court, the (tight) majorities they connect, and the
opinions those majorities issue.'
We apply our method to compositions of the United States Supreme Court
after 1946 that have over 50 tightly split opinions: the compositions of the court
defined by its junior justice being Vinson, Stewart, Powell, Stevens, O'Connor,
Kennedy, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan.
This look at 5-4 coalitions and swing votes primarily reveals an ebb and flow
of a tide of a judicial practice we callfluidity, which corresponds to the flexibility
or variability with which justices of a supreme court form tight coalitions. The
graphs allow us to observe the number of coalitions, their opinions, and swing
votes. Fluidity reaches its high point during the composition defined by Stevens
as the junior justice, i.e. from 1975 to 1981. Its adjacent compositions, Powell's
(1972-75) and O'Connor's (1981-86), are similar. However, the recent
compositions, defined by the junior justices being Alito (2006-09) and Kagan
(2010-16), differ. Those appear similar to the early ones, defined by Vinson
(1946-49) and Stewart (1958-62). Whereas we focus on the graphical
representation of 5-4 coalitions and swing votes, several additional phenomena
follow the same pattern.
The graphs of the compositions that exhibit high fluidity are different in
having more coalitions (9 to 11), linked by more swing votes (in the teens), with
those coalitions being closer to proportional in the number of opinions that they
issue. The graphs of the coalitions with low fluidity display few coalitions (3 or
4), few swing votes (2 or 3), and even fewer, usually two, coalitions doing the
lion's share of issuing opinions. Additionally, the index of fluidity follows that
pattern, reaching 0.57 for the most fluid composition of Stevens but being around
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0.30 for the least fluid ones.2 The issuance of opinions with a political slant
opposite to the majority of opinions of that coalition, what we call contraslanted
opinions, again has a high during the fluid compositions (from 2.5 percent to 5
percent compared to 0 percent to 2 percent in the less fluid ones). We speculate
about the causes of this phenomenon: how it might relate to the composition of
the court by the justices' appointing party but fails to do so.
Secondarily, this analysis reveals the limitations of attempts to fit supreme
court adjudication in locational models, especially the median voter theorem. The
strongest discrepancies with the median voter theorem are that (1) often the most
active swing vote is not the justice who according to the ideological rankings is
the median; (2) justices far from the median can be the second most active swing
vote; and (3) the busiest swing vote changes without a change of the median
justice. Moreover, even a multi-dimensional locational model cannot remain
accurate because adjudication makes new factors become important, what from
the perspective of locational models would correspond to the creation of new
dimensions. We offer the Apprendi line of cases and the uniqueness of its
coalition as an example of a creation of a new dimension that could not have been
anticipated.3
For the related literature, we refer to our prior article.
Our approach stands in contrast to attempts to identify a single justice as the
swing vote to the extent that we reveal all the swing votes of each court.4 Notably,
our approach reveals Scalia and Thomas to be significant swing votes despite not
being in the ideological middle of the court.
II. THE DATA
We use the vote-centered database of the SupremeCourtDatabase.org to
identify all 5-4 opinions and ignore opinions where less than nine justices voted.5
The version of the database that we used covers the years 1946 to 2016. The
database codes each vote on each issue in each opinion.' We ignore the issues that
2. Frank Sullivan, Jr., Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, & Dimitri Georgakopoulos, The
Fluidity of Judicial Coalitions: A Surprising Look at Coalitions within the Supreme Courts of the
United States and Indiana, JUDICATURE, Autumn 2016, at 34, 36 (developing the index of fluidity).
3. See text accompanying notes 22-23 and Appendix A, text accompanying notes 27-37.
4. The two illustrations of ideological positions of justices that stand out are from Martin
& Quinn and Bailey, with additional such graphics in other publications by Bailey. See Andrew D.
Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the
U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANAL. 134 (2002); Michael A. Bailey, Measuring Court
Preferences, 1950-2011: Agendas, Polarity and Heterogeneity (Working Paper, August 2012). See
also Wikipedia, Ideological Leanings of U.S. Supreme Court Justices (as of Sept. 28, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/7LCZ-K6HM] [hereinafter Ideological Leanings].
5. The Supreme Court Database, WASH. U. L. (Sept. 13, 2019), supremecourtdatabase.org/
data.php [https://perma.cc/ZN48-4BWN].
6. Id. The supremecourtdatabase.org codes the votes of each justice on each issue of each
dispute with a value from 1 to 8. A value of 1 means the justice voted with the majority, 2 that the
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produced other than 5-4 splits. Thus, we produce a single record for each
opinion. We make the resulting data available online at
https://mckinneylaw.iu.edu/ilr/pdf/vol53p135.pdf and produce tables of the
opinions and their summaries in Appendix B. The database codes each outcome
as liberal or conservative. We verify the database's coding and rarely disagree
with it.
III. THE GRAPHS
We illustrate the swing votes for the court's compositions from 1946 to 2016
that produced more than fifty tightly split opinions. Those turn out to be its
compositions defined by the junior justice being Vinson, Stewart, Powell,'
Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan. Figures 1 through 9 are
the results. Because the data of the United States Supreme Court do not allow as
deterministic a construction as did the Indiana data in our previous article, our
arrangement of the majorities is not fully objective.
justice dissented, 3 that the justice concurred, 4 indicates a special concurrence, 5 indicates the
judgement of the court, 6 indicates dissent from a denial of certiorari or dissent from summary
affirmation of an appeal, 7 indicates a jurisdictional dissent and 8 indicates an equally divided vote.
We treat values of 1, 3, 4, and 5 as votes for the majority and values of 2, 6, and 7 as dissenting
votes. We only count opinions, not disputes; i.e., when a single opinion adjudicates more disputes,
we only count it once.
7. Whereas Rehnquist was appointed on the same day as Powell and is listed as the junior
justice by the Supreme Court, we name this composition of the court after Powell to avoid
confusion with popular usage of the phrase "Rehnquist court" to refer to the period of Rehnquist
as the Chief Justice, which comprises several different compositions of the court.
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No of Earliest Latest Nominating
Jr. Justice Date Appointed 5-4 Ops. 5-4 op. 5-4 op. President (Party)
Vinson 6/24/1946 83 11/1946 6/1949 Truman (D)
Clark & 8/24/1949 34 6/1950 5/1953 Truman (D)
Minton 10/12/1949
Warren 10/05/1953 9 11/1953 4/1954 Eisenhower (R)
Harlan 3/28/1955 18 6/1955 10/1956 Eisenhower (R)
Brennan 10/15/1956 6 12/1956 2/1957 Eisenhower (R)
Whittaker 3/25/1957 39 4/1957 6/1958 Eisenhower (R)
Stewart 10/14/1958 84 12/1958 4/1962 Eisenhower (R)
White & 4/16/1962
Goldberg 10/1/1962 41 11/1962 6/1965 Kennedy (D)
Fortas 10/4/1965 41 12/1965 6/1967 Johnson (D)
Marshall 10/2/1967 12 6/1968 6/1969 Johnson (D)
Burger 6/23/1969 4 12/1969 12/1969 Nixon (R)
Blackmun 6/9/1970 31 12/1970 6/1971 Nixon (R)
Rehnquist 1/7/1972
&ePnwes 1/7/197 100 2/1972 6/1975 Nixon (R)
& Powell (both)
Stevens 12/19/1975 128 4/1976 6/1981 Ford (R)
O'Connor 9/25/1981 148 12/1981 7/1986 Reagan (R)
Scalia 9/26/1986 42 11/1986 6/1987 Reagan (R)
Kennedy 2/18/1988 89 4/1988 6/1990 Reagan (R)
Souter 10/9/1990 22 1/1991 6/1991 Bush I(R)
Thomas 10/23/1991 31 4/1992 6/1993 Bush I (R)
Ginsburg 8/10/1993 13 12/1993 6/1994 Clinton (D)
Breyer 8/03/1994 191 11/1994 6/2005 Clinton (D)
Roberts 9/29/2005 2 1/2006 1/2006 Bush II (R)
Alito 1/31/2006 67 5/2006 9/2009 Bush II (R)
Sotomayor 8/8/2009 17 1/2010 6/2010 Obama (D)
Kagan 8/7/2010 78 3/2011 6/2015 Obama (D)
Table 1. Appointment and duration data for compositions as defined by junior justices.!
Short tenures (of compositions that do not produce enough tightly split
opinions for a meaningful graph) separate most compositions. However, the
8. When the table identifies two justices as the junior justices, they either are appointed on
the same day, as are Rehnquist and Powell, or no 5-4 opinions appear under the first appointed
justice's composition, as is the case with Clark and White.
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compositions of Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor are in an uninterrupted sequence.
This becomes clearer in Table 1.
Table 1 lists new justices by order of appointment over the period we study,
1946-2016. Each appointed justice, as the junior justice, defines a new
composition of the court. The table has the date of appointment; the number of
tightly split opinions; the dates of the earliest and the latest split opinions; and the
nominating President and his party. In boldface are the rows of the justices who
define compositions that issue enough, namely fifty, tightly split opinions for a
graph.
We display each opinion as a curved triangle, like a very thin pizza slice,
springing from the specific point that corresponds to its majority or, to restate, as
a thick radius of a circle with its center at that majority. The result of several such
triangles springing from a single majority is an angle defining a fraction of a
circle with short lines separating the opinions of that majority. We set the largest
such fraction of a circle to be slightly (5 percent) less than a semicircle in each
figure. The result is that the size of the slice that corresponds to an opinion in
each figure varies, depending on how many opinions the most prolific majority
authored. For example, the slice corresponding to each opinion is much smaller
in the Breyer court, where the most prolific majority issued eighty-six opinions,'
compared to the Stevens court, where the most prolific majority issued 19
opinions.10 The legend of each figure has the total number of 5-4 opinions being
illustrated and the output of the most prolific majority. Appendix B lists the 5-4
opinions by majority, but again, only majorities authoring more than two
opinions.
We also display the slice corresponding to each opinion as either in
hexagonal shading or dark grey (blue or red in the online version), depending on
whether its political slant is liberal or conservative. Our coding mostly agrees
with that of SupremeCourtDatabase.org. The few disagreements are due to
placing emphasis on different levels of the outcome. We usually focus on the
outcome that is most material to the parties, but that may differ from the nature
of the outcome on a more abstract level. For example, a liberal outcome for the
parties, such as the upholding of a local tax, may be the result of a conservative
policy of a more abstract level, such as the principle of delegating more powers
to state and local authorities. Appendix B, which lists the opinions, their
summaries, and their political slant, indicates when we disagreed with the
database's coding.
The figures let us see the consistent members of the conservative and the
liberal coalitions, the swing votes, and which of the swing votes are dominant in
the sense of connecting majorities that issue a disproportionately great number
of opinions. Also interesting is the changing number of coalitions into which the
court splits. We discuss each court composition in turn. An interactive unified
graphic with popups of the opinions and their summaries is available on the
9. See infra Figure 7.
10. See infra Figure 4.
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A. The Vinson Composition (1946-49)
The first composition, defined by the appointment of Chief Justice Vinson as
the junior justice on June 24, 1946, by Democratic President Truman, consists
entirely of justices appointed by Democratic presidents, two by President Truman
(the other Truman appointee was Burton, a Republican) and all of the others by
President F.D. Roosevelt. However, tightly split decisions still arise. The
conservative side has as its core Vinson with Burton and Reed. The liberal side
has as its core Black, Douglas, and Murphy.
The graph has three coalitions issuing 100 percent liberal opinions: at the
eight o'clock, nine o'clock, and ten o'clock positions. By the short lines along the
outside of each arc separating the opinions, we see those issue, respectively,
three, seven, and four opinions. On the conservative side, the graph displays two
active coalitions, at two o'clock issuing three opinions and at three o'clock
issuing thirty-three opinions. The number of opinions of the most prolific
coalition drives the size of the arc that corresponds to each opinion. The most
prolific coalition turns out to always be a conservative one and is usually at three
o'clock. Its output is set to be 5 percent less than a semicircle. The unoccupied
dots in the circle correspond to majorities that never formed or only formed to
issue one or two opinions, which we do not display. The total number of points
in the circle, 126, corresponds to the number of five-member majorities that are
possible in a nine-member court. The lines connecting the majorities, akin to
diagonals of the circle of dots, are the swing votes. Only one vote changes when
two majorities are connected by a line. The line bears the name of the swing vote.
The main swing vote is the one departing the most prolific coalition to form the
most prolific one connected to that one, which is usually the second most prolific
coalition overall (but not in the Powell and Stevens graphs, where that distinction
goes to a second conservative coalition). Here the main swing vote is Frankfurter.
Compared to the compositions defined by Powell and later, the proportion of
majorities that do not appear on the graph is high for the Vinson composition (as
it is for the next composition, defined by Stewart). The swing vote away from the
main conservative majority that produces the majority that authors the greatest
number of liberal opinions is that of Frankfurter. Despite that Frankfurter is the
most active swing vote, the ideological ranking of the justices does not place
Frankfurter as the median justice (except for in the last term of the Vinson
composition). Rather, from the perspective of ideology the median justice is
Reed. According to the ideological ranking, Frankfurter begins Vinson's term as
the second most conservative member of the court and swings significantly
toward a more liberal rating to switch to the liberal side; he passes from the
11. The graphic of all compositions with popups of the opinions and parenthetical
descriptions is at https://mckinneylaw.iu.edu/instructors/Georgakopoulos/Prof/VisgSCtSwings-Pop
Up/VisgSCtSwings-CombinedPopupOnly.html [https://perma.cc/JT2X-SDX3]. It is also accessible
from nicholasgeorgakopoulos.org, under "Scholarship" and the entry corresponding to this article.
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median position during the last term of the Vinson composition. Upon the
appointment of Clark and Minton, Frankfurter becomes the seventh most
conservative justice, i.e., the third most liberal, after Douglas and Black (albeit
with a difference).
Bk, D,. FftNl.RP Frankfurter I tIw
Figure 1. The swing votes of the 5-4 majorities of the Vinson composition of C.J. Vinson (Vi) and Black
(Bk), Burton (Bt), Douglas (D), Frankfurter (Ff), Jackson (J), Murphy (Mu), Reed (Rd), and Rutledge (Ru), all
Democratic appointees, as they result from fifty-three opinions dating from November 18, 1946, to June 27,
1949, that were issued by majorities issuing more than two opinions and where the most prolific majority
authors thirty-three opinions (62 percent of the opinions appearing in the graph).
The second swing vote is that of Rutledge, to a majority that authors five
opinions. According to the ideological rankings, Rutledge begins the Vinson
composition as the sixth most conservative justice (the fourth most liberal after
Black, Murphy, and Douglas) and over its three terms swings to become its most
liberal member. The importance of Rutledge's swing vote given how far the
ideological rankings place him from the median is particularly interesting. An
analogous phenomenon appears during the Alito and Kagan compositions, where
the justice rated as second most conservative (Scalia) and the one rated as the
most conservative (Thomas) are, respectively, the second most active swing
votes. A single-dimensional approach based on the median voter and the
ideological ranking of the justices cannot explain how a justice who is not near
the median can have an impactful role as a swing vote.
The main (conservative) coalition also experiences the swing vote of Vinson,
to form a majority that authors four opinions. Vinson's ideological ranking places
him near the median. Therefore, the importance of Vinson's swing vote is not
surprising from the perspective of an approach that rests on the median voter.
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B. The Stewart Composition (1958-62)
Several judicial departures and appointments separate the Vinson from the
Stewart composition, the next composition that issues enough 5-4 opinions for
a meaningful graph. The justices in the Vinson composition who left the court
prior to Stewart's appointment are Burton, Jackson, Murphy, Reed, Rutledge, and
Vinson. The continuing justices are Black, Douglas, and Frankfurter. The new
justices are Brennan, Clark, Harlan, Stewart, Warren, and Whittaker. Clark was
appointed by Democratic President Truman. All other new justices are
Republican President Eisenhower's appointees, giving the court a Republican-
appointed majority, a feature that remains in all subsequent compositions that we
study. The Stewart court, however, is also tightly split by appointment, with just
five of its members being Republican appointees. This phenomenon will only
reappear during the Kagan composition, the last one we study.
*0
Stuart
WNVI N, Bit . LD- Clark
Figure 2. The swing votes of the 5-4 majorities of the Stewart composition of C.J. Warren (Wn) and Black
(Bk), Brennan (Bn), Clark (Cl), Douglas (D), Frankfurter (Ff), Harlan (Hn), Stewart (Sw), and Whittaker
(Wk)-five Republican appointees, four Democratic-as they result from sixty-one opinions dating from
December 8, 1958, to April 19, 1962, that were issued by majorities issuing more than two opinions and where
the most prolific majority authors forty opinions (66 percent of the opinions appearing in the graph).
The Stewart composition also presents an interesting and unique problem in
the categorization of its fifteen opinions related to "un-American" committee
activity. 2 The court splits 5-4 conservative, with Black, Brennan, Douglas, and
12. The Stewart composition issues several opinions related to individuals targeted as
communist sympathizers or accused of membership in the Communist Party and who had refused
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Warren in the dissent. Of those, only Black and Douglas were Democratic
appointees. This tight split, therefore, does not correspond to a difference between
appointing parties, with the caveat that Brennan, an appointee of Republican
President Eisenhower, was a Democrat. The solitary liberal opinion on this matter
reveals Stewart as the swing vote but in a curious manner.13
The ideological rankings of justices place Black and Douglas as the by far
most liberal members of this court and identify the median justices as Frankfurter,
Stewart, and Brennan (as does Bailey) or Clark and Stewart (as do Martin and
Quinn). The focus on 5-4 majorities reveals Clark as the most frequent swing
vote, closely followed by Stewart, without Frankfurter or Brennan appearing as
active swing votes.
The Stewart composition also reveals a polarization that is greater even than
the next most intense ones, those of the compositions defined by Alito and Kagan
more than forty years later. The figure of the 5-4 majorities and their swing votes
has only three majorities, because only three majorities issue more than two
opinions. The corresponding figures for the Alito and Kagan compositions have
four majorities. All other compositions produce a graph with more
majorities-significantly more in the cases of the compositions defined by
Stevens, and O'Connor, where the majorities number eleven and twelve,
to cooperate with committees akin to the House Un-American Activities Committee. The targeted
individuals objected on various grounds, mostly the right against self-incrimination and the rights
of free association. The United States Supreme Court's 5-4 opinions of this composition never
vindicated the corresponding rights despite that the dissenters were quite vocal. However one reacts
to this chapter of history and Constitutional interpretation, it presents a categorization problem.
Clearly, these opinions should not be categorized separately according to the resulting legal subject
matter, so as to scatter them in subject matters such as criminal procedure, administrative law, and
professional responsibility. Rather, these opinions belong in a single group. We place these
opinions in the broader category of opinions related to social impact. In subsequent compositions
of the Court, this category will have opinions about desegregation, abortion, and gay rights. In the
earlier composition of Vinson we only place in this category one opinion about conscientious
objectors.
13. See Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 421 (1961). In the Deutch opinion, Stewart joins
the dissenters to form a majority to reverse an individual's conviction for refusing to identify other
communists on the grounds that the questions were not pertinent to the committee's charge. The
greater ideals of civil rights do not reach the surface. Nor can one argue that the Deutch opinion
corresponds to a change in Stewart's position. Although the opinion, appearing in 1961, comes late
in this composition, opinions of the opposite slant appear before and after it. Rather than
corresponding to a change in the details of the underlying civil rights, the difference appears to stem
from the human details of the way this committee conducted its prosecution, such as calling the
same witness for the second time, forcing his appearance in the Southern Summer, and interrupting
the witness's vacation. Rather than Stewart taking the position that the committee overreached
substantively, it seems more plausible that his swing vote is due to an overreach that may be called
procedural. As a result, the swing of Stewart's vote does not fit in a model of the underlying rights
but in a model of the procedures that a governmental entity may use to exercise its advantage.
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C. The Powell Composition (1972-75)
The composition defined by the unusual appointment on the same day of
Rehnquist and Powell ("Powell composition"") is also removed from the prior
one, of Stewart, by several appointments. The continuing justices are Brennan,
Douglas, and Stewart.
In the Powell composition, Burger, Blackmun, and Rehnquist are in all the
conservative coalitions. On the other side, Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall are
in all the liberal coalitions. The swing vote away from the main conservative
majority that produces the majority that author the greatest number of liberal
opinions is that of White, an appointee of Democratic President Kennedy. This
main liberal coalition, at the nine o'clock position, authors ten opinions. It
includes White and Stewart, a Republican appointee. Stewart is also a swing vote,
producing the second most productive conservative coalition, at the four o'clock
position, which authors sixteen opinions.
14. Again, we name this composition after Powell despite that Rehnquist is considered the
junior of the two to avoid confusion from the colloquial use of "Rehnquist court" to refer to the
years that the court had Rehnquist as its Chief Justice.
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Figure 3. The swing votes of the 5-4 majorities of the Powell composition of C.J. Burger (Bg), and
Blackmun (BL), Brennan (Bn), Douglas (D), Marshall (M), Powell (P), Rehnquist (Rq), Stewart (Sw), and White
(Wt)-six Republican appointees and three Democratic-as they result from seventy-seven opinions dating
from March 22, 1972, to June 30, 1975, that were issued by majorities issuing more than two opinions and
where the most prolific majority authors thirty-seven opinions (48 percent of the opinions appearing in the
graph).
Worth noting is that Brennan, despite voting with the liberal block, was
appointed by the Republican President Eisenhower. The Democratic appointees
are Douglas (of Roosevelt), White (of Kennedy), and Marshall (of Johnson).
The analyses of ideological leaning place White as the median justice and
Stewart to his immediate left in this composition. 5 This is a composition where
the median justice, according to the ideological rankings, is also the main swing
vote; the next most active swing votes, Powell and Stewart, are also near the
ideological median, making this a composition that is not far from the
expectations of a median voter vision.




D. The Stevens Composition (1975-81)
The Stevens composition is the result of the appointment of Stevens by
Republican President Ford to replace Douglas. The majorities are much more
fluid, leaving smaller liberal and conservative cores. The conservative core is
down to Burger and Rehnquist. The liberal core is down to Brennan and
Marshall.
Strikingly, unlike all other compositions of the United States Supreme Court
that we study, the Stevens court reveals no dominant conservative or liberal
coalitions and, therefore, no dominant swing votes. Powell, who prior to the
Stevens composition, was consistently in the conservative coalitions, is now often
a swing vote. The likely explanation is that the new composition of the court
produces divisions in a more conservative way, so that Powell finds himself more
often at the center of the court. The replacement of the very leftmost member of
the court, Douglas, by a centrist conservative, Stevens, did not change the median
justice, because Stevens was more liberal than the median (and indeed appears in
four of the coalitions that issue only liberal opinions but in only one
conservative). Therefore, White's loss of the role of the main swing vote refutes
the median voter theorem.
Indeed, the ideological scorings of the justices continue to place White as the
median justice between Blackmun to his left and Powell to his right, except for
the last segment of this composition, when the ideological scorings move White
to Powell's right. Whereas White does appear as an active swing vote, his vote
does not swing away from the busiest coalition. Powell's is the most active swing
vote.
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Figure 4. The swing votes of the 5-4 majorities of the Stevens composition of C.J. Burger (Bg) and
Blackmun (BL), Brennan (Bn), Marshall (M), Powell (P), Rehnquist (Rq), Stevens (Sv), Stewart (Stewart), and
White (Wt)-seven Republican appointees and two Democratic-as they result from ninety-eight opinions
dating from April 26, 1976, to June 26, 1981, that were issued by majorities issuing more than two opinions and
where the most prolific majority authors nineteen opinions (19 percent of the opinions appearing in the graph).
The Stevens composition, therefore, is in tension with the median voter
theorem in two ways: in the change of its swing vote from the prior composition
despite the lack of change of the median justice, and in the fact that its median
justice, White, is not the busiest swing vote.
. The O'Connor Composition (1981-86)
The O'Connor composition is the result of the appointment of O'Connor by
Republican President Reagan to replace Stewart. The conservative core remains
Burger and Rehnquist. The liberal core remains Brennan and Marshall.
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The most prolific coalition is the conservative one at three o'clock, which
issues forty-six opinions. The main swing vote of White produces the most
productive liberal coalition, at the nine o'clock position, which authors twenty
opinions. The second swing vote, that of Powell, produces the liberal majority
coalition at the ten o'clock position, which authors sixteen opinions. One more
notable swing vote is that of Stevens from the main liberal coalition to form the
second most active conservative coalition at the four o'clock position, which
authors ten opinions.
The ideological ranking of the justices places White and then Powell as the
median justices of the O'Connor composition. That they are also its main swing










Figure 5. The swing votes of the 5-4 majorities of the O'Connor composition of C.J. Burger (Bg), and
Blackmun (BL), Brennan (Bn), Marshall (M), O'Connor (O'C), Powell (P), Rehnquist (Rq), Stevens (Sv), and
White (Wt)-seven Republican appointees and two Democratic-as they result from 123 opinions dating from
December 2, 1981, to July 7, 1986, that were issued by majorities issuing more than two opinions and where
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F. The Kennedy Composition (1988-1990)
The Kennedy composition is separated by one appointment from the
O'Connor composition. The Chief Justice is now Rehnquist. Justice Scalia was
nominated by Republican President Reagan and appointed on September 26,
1986. The departed justice was Chief Justice Burger. The Scalia composition,
however, produces fewer than forty-five tightly split opinions, too few for a
meaningful graphic. Justice Kennedy was also nominated by President Reagan
and appointed on February 18, 1988, replacing Powell. The court produces
eighty-nine tightly split opinions with this composition. The conservative core of
the court is Rehnquist and Scalia. The liberal core is Blackmun, Brennan, and
Marshall. White is the primary swing vote away from the main conservative
coalition. Kennedy and O'Connor tie as its secondary swing votes. From the main
liberal coalition, after White, the only swing vote is Stevens. A majority that
issues a few liberal opinions (Blackmun, Brennan, Kennedy, Marshall, and
Scalia) is not connected with a swing vote to any of the majorities that appear on
the graph, a phenomenon that also arises in the Breyer and Alito compositions.
The conservative core joined by Kennedy and O'Connor constitutes the most
productive coalition, the conservative coalition at the three o'clock position that
authors forty-seven opinions. The dominant swing vote is White, producing the
liberal majority at nine o'clock that authors twelve opinions, followed by a tie
between Kennedy and O'Connor, whose swing votes produce the liberal
majorities at the ten o'clock position and the eight o'clock position that author
four opinions each. Stevens, the secondary swing from the main liberal coalition,
produces the second conservative coalition authoring three opinions and
consisting of Rehnquist, Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Stevens.
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Figure 6. The swing votes of the 5-4 majorities of the Kennedy composition consisting of C.J. Rehnquist
(Rq) and Justices Blackmun (BL), Brennan (Bn), Kennedy (Ke), Marshall (M), O'Connor (O'C), Scalia (Sc),
Stevens (Sv), and White (Wt)-seven Republican appointees and two Democratic-as they result from seventy-
three opinions dating from April 25, 1988, to June 27, 1990, that were issued by majorities issuing more than
two opinions and where the most prolific majority authors forty-seven opinions (64 percent of the opinions
appearing in the graph).
The Kennedy composition, in having seven appointees of Republican
presidents, shares that characteristic with the preceding compositions of Stevens
and O'Connor. Nevertheless, the resulting graphic is quite different. Whereas in
the prior two compositions that had seven Republican appointees, the court split
to produce many different 5-4 coalitions, that is no longer the case. The Kennedy
graph displays only six coalitions, whereas the graphs for Stevens and O'Connor
displayed eleven and twelve coalitions. Moreover, only two of the Kennedy
graph's coalitions predominate, whereas in the Stevens and the O'Connor graphs
several of the coalitions issued similar and significant numbers of opinions.
G. The Breyer Composition (1994-2005)
The Breyer composition is separated from Kennedy's by several
appointments. Souter and Thomas, appointed by Republican President G.H.W.
Bush, replace Brennan and Marshall, respectively. Ginsburg and Breyer,
appointed by Democratic President Clinton, replace White and Blackmun,
respectively, and are the court's only Democratic appointees. The liberal core is
Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens. The conservative core is Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Thomas.
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The conservative core joined by Kennedy and O'Connor constitutes the most
productive coalition, the conservative coalition at the three o'clock position that
authors eighty-six opinions. The dominant swing vote is O'Connor, producing the
liberal majority at nine o'clock that authors thirty-one opinions, followed by
Kennedy, whose swing vote produces the liberal majority at the ten o'clock
position that authors eighteen opinions. Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter are rare
swing votes away from the liberal coalition.
w.
,J







Figure 7. The swing votes of the 5-4 majorities of the Breyer composition of C.J. Rehnquist (Rq), Breyer
(By), Ginsburg (G), Kennedy (Ke), O'Connor (O'C), Scalia (Sc), Souter (Su), Stevens (Sv), and Thomas
(T)-seven Republican appointees and two Democratic-as they result from 152 opinions dating from
November 14, 1994, to June 27, 2005, that were issued by majorities issuing more than two opinions and where
the most prolific majority authors eighty-six opinions (57 percent of the opinions appearing in the graph).
H. The Alito Composition (2006-09)
The composition defined by Alito results from the departure of O'Connor and
Rehnquist and their replacement by Alito and Roberts, appointed by Republican
President G.W. Bush.
The Alito court-similarly to the next composition that we study, the Kagan
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Figure 8. The swing votes of the 5-4 majorities of the Alito composition of C.J. Roberts (Ro) and Alito
(A), Breyer (By), Ginsburg (G), Kennedy (Ke), Scalia (Sc), Souter (Su), Stevens (Sv), and Thomas (T)-seven
Republican appointees and two Democratic-as they result from fifty-six opinions dating from May 30, 2006,
to June 29, 2009, that were issued by majorities issuing more than two opinions and where the most prolific
majority authors thirty-five opinions (63 percent of the opinions appearing in the graph).
The dominant conservative majority, at the three o'clock position, produces
thirty-five opinions and consists of Roberts, Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas.
The swing vote of Kennedy produces the dominant liberal majority, at the nine
o'clock position, which authors fifteen opinions and consists of Breyer, Ginsburg,
Kennedy, Souter, and Stevens. The other swing vote from the dominant
conservative majority, the swing of Scalia, produces a majority that authors only
three opinions, all liberal, and consists of Breyer, Ginsburg, Scalia, Souter, and
Stevens. This appears at the eight o'clock position. One more liberal majority
appears, formed by pulling both Scalia and Thomas from the conservative block,
while the liberal majority loses Breyer to the conservative side. No single swing
vote connects it with any of the prior majorities. It appears at the ten o'clock
position and issues three liberal opinions.
Notice also that despite the apparent lack of fluidity of the Alito composition,
the illustration still shows a contraslanted opinion: a barely conservative opinion
16. We drop one 5-4 opinion as not being a truly tightly split opinion; a merely apparent 5-4
split appears in Clark v. Arizona., 548 U.S. 735 (2006). One of the dissents, that of Breyer, actually
agrees with the majority's interpretation but dissents for a remand instead of a reversal. Id. at 780.
2020] ILLUSTRATING SWING VOTES II: 153
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
from the main liberal majority.' The next and last composition of the Supreme
Court that we study, the one defined by Kagan as the junior justice, has no
contraslanted opinions.18
L The Kagan Composition (2010-16)
The composition defined by Kagan results from the departure of Stevens and
Souter and their replacement by Kagan and Sotomayor by Democratic President
Barack Obama. The Kagan composition, with four Democratic appointees, has
the greatest number of Democratic appointees of any of the courts we study after
the appointment of Stewart in 1958 tipped the court to majority Republican. The
Democratic appointees are Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor.
The Kagan composition has few tight majorities issuing more than two
opinions. As in the case of the Alito composition, only four majorities produce
more than two opinions and appear on the graph.
The dominant conservative majority, at the three o'clock position, produces
thirty-three opinions and consists of Roberts, Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, and
Thomas. The swing vote of Kennedy produces the dominant liberal majority, at
the nine o'clock position, which authors twenty-three opinions and consists of
Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, Kennedy, and Sotomayor. The other swing vote from
the dominant conservative majority, that of Thomas, produces a liberal majority
that authors only three opinions and consists of Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan,
Sotomayor, and Thomas. A conservative majority of a quite different
composition, so that no single swing vote connects it with any of the prior
majorities, appears at the four o'clock position and issues five opinions. This
17. Marramav. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365 (2007) (holding that bankruptcy courts
have the authority to block abusive attempts to convert a chapter 7 filing into a chapter 13
proceeding; the dissent would allow no such discretion).
Outside of the majorities illustrated in the graphic, a single majority issues opinions with both
conservative and liberal slants. The majority of Alito, Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Stevens
issues one liberal opinion and one conservative one.
The liberal opinion lets states deviate from the letter of the statute and ignore small school
districts when following the statutory algorithm for equalizing per-pupil expenditures. Zuni Pub.
Sch. Distr. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81 (2007).
The conservative opinion allows states to assign to judges rather than juries the determination
of the facts that trigger consecutive rather than concurrent running of sentences, an exception to
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 172 (2009).
18. The Kagan composition, like the Alito one, has a single majority that issues one opinion
of each slant. The majority that issues one opinion of each slant on the Alito composition is Alito,
Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Stevens. On the Kagan composition it is Roberts, Alito, Breyer,
Scalia, and Thomas. That coalition could have arisen in the Alito composition. Yet, it did not. If
it arose in the Alito composition, the dissenters would have been Ginsburg, Kennedy, Souter, and
Stevens. The actual dissenters on the Kagan composition were Ginsburg, Kagan, Kennedy, and
Sotomayor.
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majority takes the vote of Breyer from the liberal group but loses the vote of
Scalia from the conservative group. It consists of Roberts, Alito, Breyer,
Kennedy, and Thomas.
3.
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Figure 9. The swing votes of the 5-4 majorities of the Kagan composition of C.J. Roberts (Ro) and Alito
(A), Breyer (By), Ginsburg (G), Kagan (Kg), Kennedy (Ke), Scalia (Sc), Sotomayor (Sm), and Thomas
(T)-five Republican appointees and four Democratic-as they result from sixty-four opinions dating from
March 29, 2011, to June 29, 2015, that were issued by majorities issuing more than two opinions and where the
most prolific majority authors thirty-three opinions (52 percent of the opinions appearing in the graph).
IV. THE EBB AND FLOW OF FLuIDITY
The primary phenomenon that this 1946-2016 graphical sojourn across 5-4
coalitions, their opinions, and the swing votes connecting them, reveals is first an
increase and then a decrease of what we call fluidity. High fluidity corresponds
to a court where justices coalesce in different ways to form many 5-4 coalitions,
where each coalition issues a number of opinions similar to that of the other
coalitions and many swing votes connect those coalitions. Low fluidity
corresponds to a court that forms few coalitions, where even fewer coalitions
dominate the issuance of opinions and few swing votes exist. Whereas making
a consequentialist argument in favor of high or low fluidity must remain a future
project, high fluidity corresponds to a truer collective nature of making decisions,
as opposed to a court with a single swing vote, where some decisions effectively
depend on a single vote.
The graphs reveal that in the 1946 to 2016 period that we study, fluidity
tended to gradually increase, reached its maximum during the Stevens
composition (1975-81), and then tended to gradually decrease. This phenomenon
is in part visible in the graphs. The graphs corresponding to high fluidity-the
compositions defined by Powell ('72-75), Stevens ('75-81), and O'Connor
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('81-86)-show that several coalitions issue opinions (seven to twelve), that the
number of opinions each coalition issues is closer to proportional, while also
having a multitude of swing votes (six to twelve, justices can appear more than
once as swing votes between different coalitions). The graphs illustrating the
opposite extreme of low fluidity are those of the compositions defined by Stewart
('58-62), Alito ('06-09), and Kagan ('10-16). They have few coalitions (three
or four) with one or two coalitions dominating the issuance of opinions. They also
have few swing votes (two or three). Moreover in the case of the Alito and Kagan
compositions, a single swing vote dominates, that of Kennedy.
Table 2 collects metrics related to fluidity for the compositions illustrated by
graphs above. The first three rows have the junior justice who defines the
composition of the court, the calendar years of that composition, and the political
composition of the court by appointing party, i.e., the number of justices
appointed by presidents of each party. The Vinson composition is entirely
nominated by Democratic presidents and the only one with a majority of
Democratic appointees. Next, Stewart's composition is tightly split by party,
which only arises again at the last composition we study, Kagan's.
The next two rows have, in row 4, the number of 5-4 coalitions that form in
total and, in row 5, the number of 5-4 coalitions that appear on the graph (by
issuing more than two opinions). Row 6 has the percentage that the coalitions that
appear on the graph are as a fraction of the total number of coalitions formed.
Row 7 has the number of opinions issued by the most prolific coalition and
row 8 that number as a fraction of the total number of opinions that appear on the
graph, an imprecise metric but one that is high when fluidity is low because the
busiest coalition issues many opinions, and which is low when fluidity is high,
reflecting the fact that each coalition issues close to a proportional number of
opinions. This follows the expected pattern. It is lowest during the Stevens
composition and high during the compositions that have low fluidity, taking its
highest value during the Stewart composition.
Row 9 has the number of swing votes that appear on the graph, again
following the pattern by being high during the Powell, Stewart, and O'Connor
compositions and low during the Vinson, Stewart, Alito, and Kagan ones.
In row 10 appears the index of fluidity, which we developed previously.19
Whereas it has the small fluctuations that a precise metric would tend to produce,
we see a clear break between higher values (.43 and above) for the Vinson,
Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor compositions and lower values (below .35) for
the compositions of, Stewart, Kennedy, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan.
19. See Sullivan et al., supra note 2.
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1op siin I 1
1 C mpositlon/ Vinson Stewart Powell Stevens O'Connor Kennedy Breyer Alito Kagan
2. Years '4649 582 72-751 '75-81 '81-86 '88-90 '94-05 '06-09 '10-16
3. - 0-9 5-4 6-3 7-2 7-2 7-2 7-2 7-2 5-4
4. Total coalitions 28 19 23 33 j33 19 35 14 13
5. Coalitions on graph 5 3 7 11 12 6 8 4 4
6. Coal'n % on graph 18% 16% 1 30% 33% 36% 32% 23% 29% 31%
7. Most opin's by coalition 33 40 1 37 19 1 46 47 86 35 33
8. Most as % of graph 62% 66% 48% 19% 1 37% 64% 57% 63% 52%
9. Swing on graph 3 2 6 11 12 4 6 2 2
10. Fluidity index .47 .31 .43 .57 .45 .31 .34 .29 .32
ILj Contraslanted 0 0 2 3 6 0 2 1 0
12. ConsrasI'd % of 1r %- 2.6% 3,1%1 1 4.9% / -0% 1.3% 1.8% 0%I
Table 2. Metrics Related to Fluidity.
A phenomenon that is not immediately related to the above understanding of
fluidity is in harmony with the same pattern. We have mentioned that most
coalitions only issue opinions of one political slant, either only conservative or
only liberal opinions, and contraslanted are those opinions that have a political
slant opposite to that of the majority of opinions of the coalition that issues them.
The number of contraslanted opinions, in row 11, is very low, not allowing
confident conclusions. Nevertheless, their percentage, in row 12, follows the
pattern. The percentage of contraslanted opinions is higher during the courts with
great fluidity, ranging from 2.6 percent to 4.9 percent. It is at its lowest during the
compositions with low fluidity, being zero in three compositions (Vinson's,
Stewart's, and Kagan's) and 1.8 percent during Alito's. Dearth of contraslanted
opinions should appear during environments of more intense differences between
members of the court. Abundance of contraslanted opinions, by contrast, should
appear when the members of the court have less concern about the political
aspects of adjudication. A composition with high fluidity should also be less
politically polarized. Therefore, it should also be more likely to issue
contraslanted opinions.
We return to the potential relevance of the political composition of the court
by appointing party for fluidity. One can easily formulate a theory that a court
dominated by a single party, i.e., that has a supermajority of justices (six or more
in the case of a nine-member court) appointed by presidents of the same party,
will tend to produce more fluidity. A court that is tightly split by its appointing
party should be less fluid because, given that there will always be some quantity
of issues on which the political parties are split, those issues will split the court
5-4; the appointees of one party in agreement with each other and in
disagreement with the appointees of the other party, resulting in predictable and
fixed coalitions. By contrast, if a supermajority (six or more) appointees are from
the same party, what splits the court 5-4 will not be issues that split the parties;
those issues will be decided by a supermajority vote. Rather, when such a court
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splits 5-4, those divisions will be less predictable and more varied. That would
produce a more fluid court, a court that splits 5-4 in many ways, as opposed to
the court that is tightly split by appointing party.
Appealing as this hypothesis may be, it has some but limited purchase in the
data. Granted, the four most fluid courts that we see are all dominated by one
party. The compositions defined by Vinson (dominated by Democratic
appointees) and by Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor (dominated by Republican
appointees) conform to the hypothesis.20 Moreover, as the hypothesis predicts,
two of the least fluid courts are tightly split by appointing party. These are the
compositions defined by Stewart and Kagan.
However, the Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito compositions contradict the
hypothesis that dominance by one party produces fluidity, as do the Vinson
composition's attributes other than its index. The Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito
compositions had only two Democratic appointees (as did the Stevens and
O'Connor compositions). Nevertheless, Kennedy's composition departed from
the fluidity displayed by the preceding compositions of Stevens and O'Connor
and this has continued with the Breyer, Alito, and Kagan compositions.
Additional concerns, either at appointing time or during the tenure of the justices,
may influence the court's fluidity in ways that the division by appointing party
is too facile to capture. Perhaps, some of the appointees of Presidents Reagan and
G.H.W. Bush, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, may have been
unlike the prior Republican appointees in ways that initiated a reduction of
fluidity despite the appearance of continuity in the appointing party. We leave
such speculation to others.
In sum, our primary contribution is that we observe an ebb and flow of
fluidity. The phenomenon is supported by numerous additional metrics and, in
turn, supports our index of fluidity by being consistent with it. However, these
changes of fluidity are not amenable to simple analysis. Rather, we would like to
flag fluidity as an important attribute of supreme courts that needs better
understanding and is amply worthy of further analysis.
V. LIMITATIONS OF LOCATIONAL MODELS
The graphical and geometric nature of the graphs naturally lends itself to a
comparison with locational models of adjudication. We find major discrepancies
with the simpler median voter theorem but also with multidimensional models.
The median voter theorem takes a one-dimensional view of voting, from the
political right to the political left. It posits that in an environment dominated by
two parties, the party that obtains the vote of the median voter wins the elections.
Effectively, voters are aligned in that one dimension. The central voter, the
20. A complication about the Vinson composition is that its high fluidity index is driven by
having many coalitions which only produce one or two opinions and, therefore, do not appear on
the graph. Otherwise, it exhibits all the phenomena of low fluidity: few visible coalitions, few
swing votes, and no contraslanted opinions.
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median, breaks any tie, and the party that obtains that vote gets the majority.'
Simplistic as this model may be, applying it to adjudication is
straightforward. One would arrange the justices on a single dimension, from right
to left. The model suggests that the median justice's vote would resolve close
cases, i.e., the 5-4 cases that we study here. Indeed, political scientists armed with
big data computational methods have produced right-to-left ideological scorings
of justices. 2
If the ideological positions of each judge were precise and expressed with
exactitude, then the median voter theorem would become a deterministic model
that is utterly inconsistent with the data. Only two coalitions would exist in every
composition of the court and the median justice would be the only swing vote.
Giving the median voter theorem some additional complexity, the vote on each
case would take additional uncertainty, effectively adding some randomness to
each vote, perhaps corresponding to each judge's perception of each case being
different, colored by various circumstances. This would allow judges to appear
to have swapped positions, if, for example, a more liberal judge perceives a
dispute as deserving a less liberal outcome while the next less liberal judge
perceives it as deserving a more liberal one. In that version of the model, the
outcomes would depend on the size of the variation that the added randomness
would allow. If little variation existed, the model might lead to merely the
occasional other swing vote, besides the true median. If a lot of variation were
added, the model could produce many different coalitions and swing votes. The
latter outcome seems unrealistic and the data does not conform to the notion of
many random coalitions. The former would imply that the occasional second
swing vote would be adjacent to the median. However, occasionally the second
swing votes we see are far from the median, as was the case with Scalia and
Thomas in recent compositions, and Rutledge during the composition defined by
Vinson. Therefore, the data are incompatible with the simple locational model of
the medial voter theorem, either in a version of accurate locations or one with
added randomness.
Table 3 collects information comparing the ideological ranking of justices
and the swing votes of each composition. Row 2 has the median justice according
to the two leading ideological rankings of the justices (but only the first one, by
Martin and Quinn, reaches Vinson's composition). Row 3 has the actual main
swing vote, i.e., the vote that connects the busiest coalition to the next one linked
by a swing vote. Whereas the main swing vote is included as one of the median
voters in 13 of the potential 17 comparisons, true absolute agreement exists for
only four of the nine compositions we study. In other words, the two ideological
rankings and the main swing vote are only identified correctly and exclusively in
four compositions: Powell's, Kennedy's, Alito's, and Kagan's. In all other
compositions, the ideological rankings disagree or identify several different
21. The median voter theorem tracks its ancestry to Harold Hotelling, Stability in
Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41-57 (1929).
22. See Martin & Quinn, supra note3; Bailey, supra note 3. See also Ideological Leanings,
supra note 3.
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median voters over the composition's duration. To the extent that the second
ideological ranking purports to be an improvement, it identifies correctly only
O'Connor as the median for Breyer's composition but performs more poorly than
the original ranking in Stewart's composition, where only the original ranking
included the actual main swing vote, Clark, as a median justice. Both ideological
rankings fail in the Stevens composition, where the main swing vote is Powell,
whom neither study includes as a median justice despite producing alternating
median justices.
Row 4 has the number of opinions issued by the coalition to which the main
swing vote goes-usually the second most active coalition. Those are the
majorities that this swing vote creates when it swings away from the busiest
coalition. Row 5 expresses this number as a percentage of the opinions that
appear on the graph. Row 6 expresses this number as a percentage of the number
of opinions issued by the most active coalition. When a single swing vote
dominates, as does Kennedy's during the compositions defined by Alito and
Kagan, those percentages are elevated.
Row 7 has the secondary swing vote, i.e., the one connecting the busiest
coalition to the second most prolific linked coalition. Row 8 has the ideological
ranking of that justice by the two rankings. In three compositions, Vinson's,
Alito's, and Kagan's, the secondary swing vote has an ideological ranking far
from the median. Rutledge is ranked as the most liberal member of the Vinson
composition. Thomas is ranked at the conservative extreme of the Kagan
composition. Scalia is ranked as the second most conservative member of the
Alito composition. The tie of Kennedy and O'Connor as secondary swing votes
during the Kennedy composition complicates their ranking, but O'Connor also
appears as the second most conservative justice for a period of that composition
but only according to the second ideological ranking, Bailey's. Whereas the
median voter theorem, even with added randomness, would argue that the
secondary swing vote should be adjacent to the median, that repeatedly fails to
occur. Not rarely, the Supreme Court has had its secondary swing vote be far
from the median.
1. Composition/Jr. Justice Vinson Stewart Powell Stevens O'Conor Kennedy Breyer Alito Kagan
Clark White
Reed Stewart/ Stewart Kennedy,
2. Median per M&Q/B Frankf Frankf. White Blackm P White O'Connor/ Kennedy Kennedy
Burton Stewart. White O'Conmor
Brennan Stewart
ain swing vote Frank Clark White Powell hite W hite onno Kennedy Kennedy
4. Swing to opinions 7 11 10 7 20 12 31 15 23
5. Mai swas % of graph 13% 18% 10OV 7% 16% 16% 20% 27%4 36%
6. As % of most active 21% 28% 27% 37% 43% 26% 36% 43% 70%
7. Secondary swing vote Rutledge Stewart Powell Blackn. Powell K, O'C Kennedy Scalia I Thomas
1. Rank per M&Q/B 7-9 43-5 4 3/34,6 1743- - 34/234 5,4/4 2/3 1
9. Swing to opinions 4 10 3 3 16 4 18 3 3
10. Sec'ry sw as %ofmain 57% 90% 30% 43% 80% 33% 58%1 20% 13%
Table 3. Ideological Ranking and Swing Votes.
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A related discrepancy with the median voter theorem comes from comparing
the Powell composition to that of Stevens. The membership of the court changed
by a single member, by the replacement of Douglas by Stevens. Douglas was by
far the most liberal member of the court. Admittedly, Stevens, despite being the
nominee of Republican President Ford, was not very conservative. (Stevens
appears on the liberal side of that court of seven Republican appointees.) For
evaluating the median voter theorem, the point is that the replacement of far-left
Douglas with the moderate Stevens did not change the median justice. In a direct
contradiction of the median voter theorem, when Stevens replaces Douglas, the
main swing vote changes from White to Powell.
Granted, the one-dimensional nature of the median voter theorem is
simplistic, making its rejection by the data unremarkable. However, this data
reveals a phenomenon that shows that even locational models with many
dimensions cannot be durable. Despite that an ideal model with many dimensions
could capture nuance, it could still not account for the creation of new
dimensions. Adjudication by supreme courts, however, often creates new
dimensions, adding new tests or elements for a legal conclusion, or removing
them by overruling such precedent. An illustration of a creation of a new test, i.e.,
a new dimension from the perspective of locational modelling, in criminal
procedure arises in the Apprendi line of cases in this data.
Apprendi is about criminal procedure, interpreting due process and the right
to a jury trial in the context of sentencing enhancements. 23 Sentencing
enhancements increase criminal penalties in specific circumstances. In the
example of Apprendi's facts, the penalty increased due to racial animus in the
commission of the crime. The Apprendi line of opinions holds that facts which
increase the maximum sentence must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thus, even if a fact is not an element of the crime, if this fact triggers an
increase of the maximum penalty, then Apprendi requires it to be treated the same
way that elements of the crime are. In a trial, the jury must establish this fact
beyond reasonable doubt. The majority that produced Apprendi appears at the 11
o'clock position of the Breyer graph and has the additional feature that this
majority only formed to issue the Apprendi line of opinions and one unrelated
opinion on tort liability.24 Moreover, this majority has no swing votes linking it
with the others of the graph. It draws two votes from the conservative side of the
court, Scalia and Thomas. Also, it fails to draw Breyer's vote from the liberal side
of the court.
Suppose that a locational model of criminal procedure had been created
before the first of the Apprendi opinions were issued, i.e., before Jones. This
model completely described criminal procedure and each justice's attitudes about
every aspect of it. The model would be a perfect description of criminal
procedure and would perfectly predict every vote of every justice on every
criminal procedure issue. Despite its completeness, however, this model of
criminal procedure would use inferences from prior precedent to answer the
23. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
24. See infra Appendix A, text accompanying notes 23-27.
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question whether penalty enhancements should be found by juries beyond
reasonable doubt-to wit, not the Apprendi holding. Moreover, the justices' other
positions on criminal procedure did not foretell their position on this issue,
because this was a unique coalition. In other words, this complete model of
criminal procedure would be rendered obsolete by the Apprendi line of cases
because they created a new dimension in criminal procedure. The fact that this
new dimension involved a coalition that had not formed for any other issue of
criminal procedure underscores its novelty and that it could not have been
predicted by the previously correct model.25
VI. CONCLUSION
Fluidity is an important attribute of adjudication by supreme courts. Our
graphical presentation of the coalitions, the swing votes, and the opinions of
supreme court compositions allowed not only a quantitative approach to fluidity
but also a visual one. We hope this opens avenues for further research.
We submit that this analysis refutes the possibility of having locational
models of either the level of generality of the median voter theorem or of the level
of complete specificity that would account for every interpretation. The median
voter theorem fails because (a) the most active swing vote is often not the median
by ideology justice; (b) the second most active swing vote is often far from the
ideological median; and (c) the pattern of coalitions does not conform to the
predictions of the median voter theorem, which would call for two dominant
coalitions plus additional coalitions due to noise. A locational model of complete
specificity is refuted by the creation of new and unexpected coalitions (and
dimensions), as exemplified by the Apprendi coalition.
This analysis also has relevance about the efficiency of the common law and
plaintiffs' victory rate, inviting further research in those directions. The argument
about the efficiency of the common law rests on the notion that ineffective
interpretations would attract litigation, which would lead to their alteration.
Support for this hypothesis may stem from the persistence of the litigation about
Un-American Activities Committees that appears in the Stewart composition. To
the extent those results were not in harmony with straightforward understandings
of the First Amendment, their repeated litigation despite repeated 5-4 losses
supports the premise that some outcome (arguably inefficient) will attract
litigation. The persistence of the litigation without a change of outcome during
that composition does not support the conclusion that the repeated litigation will
change the law. However, the predominance of criminal procedure in all
compositions may serve as a counterexample. In the Vinson composition, we see
the Court stating that the Constitution must not be interpreted so as to dictate to
25. In Appendix A we pursue the information contained in the swing votes connecting the
Apprendi coalition to the coalitions issuing one or two opinions and which, therefore, do not appear
on the graph. Only one helps explain a likely change in Justice Thomas, again underlining the
novelty and unpredictability of the Apprendi line of cases.
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the states their criminal procedure. 26 By today's standards, that is a quaint
anachronism. Federal criminal procedure dominates that of the states, despite
herculean efforts by the legislature to limit the involvement of the federal
judiciary, for example by limiting habeas corpus jurisdiction.27 The argument that
this outcome-the subsuming of state criminal procedure by federal
Constitutional interpretation-is efficient, seems quite difficult to make. More
likely, this is an expression of a different premise, that what attracts litigation is
not inefficient interpretations about criminal procedure but every conviction with
a colorable Constitutional argument. The result, then, would not be a more
efficient criminal procedure law but, at least, a more federalized criminal
procedure.
Turning to expected rates of victory, it is striking that in all
compositions-from the all-Democratic-appointee Vinson composition, to the
heavily Republican-appointee courts of 1972 to 2010 -the outcomes skew
conservative and the rate of conservative outcomes is almost constant. Because
the Court, through the process of granting certiorari, determines its own docket,
any conclusions will not reflect the decisions of plaintiffs and defendants but the
process of granting certiorari. A process that selected disputes for being on the
cusp of a divided court, should tend to produce outcomes that would be more
evenly split. That in all compositions a conservative skew appears likely suggests
additional complexities in the selection of disputes.
26. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 175 (1946) ("[T]he Due Process Clause has never been
perverted so as to force upon the forty-eight States a uniform code of criminal procedure.")
27. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996); Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (1996) (both
imposing procedural requirements designed to limit litigation).
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